

MARCH 2026

N°6



CAPS MONITORING

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INTRODUCTORY WORDS BY THE DIRECTOR

Dear readers,

Welcome to a new issue of our regular monthly CAPS Monitoring of geopolitical and economic developments in Asia. This edition shows quite clearly how different regions of this continent are being reshaped by the interaction of geopolitics, economics, and technology.

In Central Asia, energy diversification and new diplomatic formats such as CA5+UK underline how these countries are attracting renewed Western attention, particularly in the areas of critical minerals, connectivity, and strategic corridors.

At the same time, traditional players like China or Russia remain deeply embedded, which keeps the balance delicate and highly competitive, underscoring the importance of the so-called multivectoral foreign policies.

In Southeast and South Asia, we examine how climate policy, AI governance, and domestic political transitions intersect with security tensions (from Myanmar's diplomatic escalation to the sharp Pakistan–Afghanistan military escalation). These developments remind us how quickly regional instability can carry wider economic and geopolitical consequences.

East Asia and China, meanwhile, highlight the growing fusion of security and industrial strategy. The U.S. tariff uncertainty, semiconductor competition, corporate governance reforms in South Korea, Japan's evolving security posture after a landslide election victory of Sana Takaichi and her Liberal Democratic Party, and China's currency and trade ambitions all point to a more assertive and economically securitized Indo-Pacific landscape.



Finally, in our “Asia in Czechia” section, we track how these broader dynamics translate into practical implications for the Czech Republic, from trade negotiations and automotive competition to labor mobility and high-tech cooperation.

Last but not least, the overview of the previous events – a seminar on the Lunar New Year tradition and its impact on Asian culture and business by Vít Vojta and the lecture on the importance of the relations between Central Asia and the European Union by Dr. Elzbieta Pron from Poland show, how CAPS is positioning itself as a center of highly valuable knowledge on Asia not only in Czechia, but in the whole region of Central Europe. This fact is then underpinned by the interview with Marina Shaikh from India, our new member of the Advisory Board and a founder of The Rising World Foundation.

I hope this overview helps you better navigate the fast-moving developments across the Asia-Pacific region.

Jan Železný, Ph.D.

Executive Director of the Center for Asia-Pacific Studies (CAPS), CEVRO University



CENTRAL ASIA


Turkmenistan: Energy Diversification and EU Connectivity

In February 2026, Turkmenistan reaffirmed energy diversification as a strategic priority. President Serdar Berdimuhamedow emphasized progress on the Serhetabat-Herat section of the TAPI pipeline and further development of the Galkynysh gas field. TAPI would allow exports of up to 33 bcm annually to South Asian markets, reducing reliance on China, although political and security risks in Afghanistan continue to delay implementation.

China remains Turkmenistan's primary gas partner, importing roughly 40 bcm per year via Central Asia-China pipeline, with CNPC playing a key role in developing Galkynysh, one of the world's largest gas fields.

At the same time, dialogue with the European Union has intensified amid Brussels' efforts to diversify energy routes and strengthen strategic autonomy. Potential participation in the Trans-Caspian and Southern Gas Corridor projects could open access to European markets, but opposition from Russia and Iran, remain significant obstacles.

Overall, Turkmenistan is pursuing a multi-vector strategy aimed at balancing China, South Asia and the EU while expanding production and export capacity.



CA5+UK Summit: Britain's Strategic Pivot

On February 25 and 26, 2026, the United Kingdom hosted the inaugural Central Asia-U.K. (CA5+UK) foreign ministers' meeting in London, featuring high-level diplomatic engagements including a working lunch hosted by Prince Edward, Duke of Edinburgh, at Lancaster House. The summit brought together the top diplomats from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan alongside British officials, including Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper. The primary agenda centered on strengthening multilateral ties, establishing joint research centers, and expanding cooperation in education, science, and technology. Central Asian ministers emphasized the importance of academic mobility pointing to existing successful ventures such as the establishment of independent campuses by leading British universities in Kazakhstan and the growing regional demand for English-language educational programs.

Beyond cultural and educational exchanges, the diplomatic discussions heavily prioritized economic expansion, security, and infrastructure development. The meetings facilitated significant framework-level commitments, most notably a new critical minerals roadmap signed with Kazakhstan through 2028, as well as broader regional agreements focusing on carbon capture, green energy transition, and transport logistics.

These engagements reflect a coordinated effort by Central Asian states to utilize the new CA5+UK platform to attract foreign capital, modernize their domestic infrastructure, and develop the East-West international transport corridor while maintaining their multivector foreign policies. The formalization of the CA5+UK framework indicates a deliberate strategic pivot by London to deepen its economic and political footprint in a region traditionally dominated by Russia and China. This multilateral outreach aligns directly with a broader Western imperative to secure alternative supply chains for critical minerals and diversify energy resources.



SOUTHEAST ASIA

Singapore Leads Regional Push for Sustainable Aviation Fuel

Singapore announced the introduction of a new aviation levy to finance the use of sustainable aviation fuel (SAF), making flights departing from Changi Airport slightly more expensive from late 2026. The surcharge, ranging from 1 to 41.60 Singapore dollars depending on travel distance and cabin class, will apply to tickets sold after April 1 to departures after October 1.

The measure supports Singapore's broader strategy to position itself as a regional hub for SAF production. The state already hosts Southeast Asia's largest SAF facility and is beginning construction of a next generation plant, with supply agreements in place for major carriers. Regionally, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Indonesia have launched or expanded SAF production, while the Philippines is easing regulations to attract investors. ASEAN estimates Southeast Asia will produce up to 8.5 million barrels of SAF per day by 2050, leveraging abundant agricultural and forestry waste resources.

The push aligns with global aviation decarbonization efforts. Aviation accounts for roughly 2.5% of global carbon emissions, according to the International Energy Agency, and the International Civil Aviation Organization has set a net-zero emissions target for 2050. SAF could reduce aviation emissions by up to 65%. Recent policy shifts in the United States have introduced uncertainty into global SAF expansion, potentially creating space for Southeast Asia to assume a more prominent role in sustainable fuel markets.



Diplomatic escalation between Myanmar and East Timor

In February 2026, diplomatic relations between Myanmar and East Timor deteriorated significantly after Myanmar's military authorities ordered the departure of East Timor's senior diplomat from Yangon. The expulsion followed the Timorese judicial authorities' decision earlier in the month to open legal proceedings against senior members of Myanmar's military leadership for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The case, reportedly filed under the principle of universal jurisdiction, targets several junta officials, including Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing. It represents the first instance of a member of ASEAN initiating legal proceedings against another member state, and thereby challenging the bloc's long-standing principle of non-interference as part of the ASEAN Way approach.

At the same time, Thailand signaled its willingness to facilitate local-level contacts between Myanmar authorities and ethnic armed groups along their shared border, if requested. Following the informal talks in Phuket, Thailand emphasized that any reconciliation process must originate internally within Myanmar, but expressed readiness to act as a bridge to help Myanmar re-engage with ASEAN, if there is clear progress in starting talks, allowing humanitarian aid and following ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus. Thailand and Myanmar also discussed improving cooperation against cross-border crime, reopening border trade, and increasing economic and energy cooperation.



SOUTH ASIA

Bangladesh Elections

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by Tarique Rahman, secured a two-thirds majority in the country's first general election since the 2024 student-led uprising that ended Sheikh Hasina's 15 year rule. The Awami League was barred from participating, marking a decisive political shift.

The BNP-led alliance won 212 parliamentary seats, while Jamaat-e-Islami emerged as the main opposition with 77 seats. Voter turnout was approximately 59%, and although some allegations of irregularities were raised, the Election Commission described the vote as one of the most credible in decades. Rahman, who recently returned from long-term exile, is expected to become prime minister.

The incoming government faces significant challenges, including economic stabilization, rising living costs, youth unemployment, and recalibrating relations with India, whose Prime Minister Narendra Modi has already congratulated Rahman on his victory. This election represents a major political transition and a test of Bangladesh's democratic consolidation following years of centralized rule.





India AI Impact Summit 2026

The India AI Impact Summit 2026, held in New Delhi from February 16 to 21, marked a significant milestone as the first major artificial intelligence governance gathering hosted in the Global South. The event attracted over 100,000 attendees, including multiple heads of state and prominent technology executives such as Google's Sundar Pichai and OpenAI's Sam Altman.

Central to the summit was the adoption of the New Delhi Declaration on AI Impact, a non-binding framework endorsed by approximately 90 nations – including major geopolitical competitors like the United States, China, and Russia. This agreement emphasized the democratization of AI resources, seeking to make computational power and foundational models more accessible to developing economies while focusing on themes of human capital, inclusivity, and sustainable technology deployment.

The event served to showcase the host nation's ambitious technology agenda and its capacity to attract substantial capital, generating over \$250 billion in infrastructure investment commitments aimed at expanding data centers and semiconductor manufacturing.

While the summit heavily featured global partnerships, including collaborations between Western tech firms and local conglomerates, it also highlighted domestic advancements, such as the introduction of newly trained foundational models designed for regional languages. The summit successfully broadened the geographical scope of global AI diplomacy, yet the non-binding nature of the resulting declaration reveals inherent limitations in enforcement.




Pakistan–Afghanistan Military Escalation

The late February 2026 escalation between Pakistan and Afghanistan, initiated by Pakistan's "Operation Ghazab lil-Haq," marks a severe breakdown in regional security. Following deadly domestic terror attacks, Pakistani jets bombed alleged militant hideouts in Kabul, Kandahar, and Paktia. Afghan Taliban forces immediately retaliated with cross-border ground offensives and drone strikes against Pakistani military installations. Pakistan's Defense Minister has explicitly declared an open war, shattering the fragile Qatar-mediated ceasefire.

This direct military confrontation carries profound geopolitical implications. For a long time, Pakistan and Afghanistan fought indirectly by supporting different rebel and terrorist groups hiding on each other's territory. Now, the indirect fighting has turned into a direct, physical war involving a nuclear-armed state.

A sustained conflict threatens to collapse regional border governance, stall international trade corridors, and trigger a massive humanitarian and refugee crisis. Because the risk of a wider disaster is so high, China and Saudi Arabia are rushing to step in and negotiate peace. They are actively trying to stop the chaos from spilling over into neighboring countries and prevent extremist groups from taking advantage of the war to grow stronger and spread across the rest of Asia.



EAST ASIA

Japan, South Korea, Taiwan still under US tariffs

Following the U.S. Supreme Court's 6-3 decision to strike down the Trump administration's IEEPA-based "Liberation Day" tariffs, the U.S. rapidly deployed alternative trade measures, sustaining economic uncertainty for key East Asian allies.

The administration immediately invoked Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 to implement a temporary 10 percent global surcharge, valid for up to 150 days.

For Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, this structural adjustment yields little practical change to their trade environment. Having previously negotiated bilateral agreements to cap their "Liberation Day" tariffs at 15 percent in exchange for substantial U.S. investments, these nations now face the new Section 122 surcharge appended to their baseline Most Favored Nation (MFN) or free-trade (KORUS) rates.

Consequently, the previous tariff levels are largely replicated, though South Korea benefits from a marginally lower overall burden due to its existing free-trade framework. To establish a permanent tariff framework before the temporary 150-day window expires, the U.S. plans to launch expedited Section 301 investigations based on the 2025 National Trade Estimate report.

These investigations face the complex requirement of proportionally quantifying retaliation against diverse barriers, ranging from tangible Japanese and Taiwanese agricultural protections to complex South Korean digital regulations. Despite the stringent evidentiary demands of Section 301, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have signaled their intent to honor their recent multibillion-dollar U.S. investment commitments.

Their continued compliance is dictated by two overarching vulnerabilities: their fundamental reliance on the U.S. for national security, and their critical exposure to unaffected Section 232 national security tariffs, which continue to give the U.S. immense leverage over their vital automotive and semiconductor export industries.

Takaichi's landslide reshapes Japan's mandate for hard-security reforms

On 8 February 2026, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's decision to call a snap election less than four months after assuming office paid off decisively. Her Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) secured around 316 of the 465 seats in the House of Representatives, the first time since the Second World War that a single party has captured a two-thirds majority on its own. The result not only crushed the newly formed centrist opposition alliance but also vindicated Takaichi's bet that voters would reward her promise of stronger defence, a firmer line on China and constitutional revision, even against the backdrop of persistent concerns about inflation and living costs. Major international outlets and regional analysts interpret the outcome as a mandate for a more assertive Japanese role in Indo-Pacific security, tightly linked to the US alliance and increasingly intertwined with the Taiwan question.

Politically, the new configuration gives the LDP the capacity to override the upper house on most legislation and, in combination with sympathetic smaller parties, to potentially advance constitutional amendments that previous administrations could only contemplate rhetorically. Takaichi has long advocated revising Article 9 to clarify the status of the Self-Defense Forces and enable a more "normal" military posture, including enhanced counter-strike capabilities and tighter integration with US operational planning. Her public comments in late 2025, suggesting that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could constitute a "survival-threatening situation" that would justify Japanese involvement, signal a willingness to move beyond the traditional ambiguity that has characterised Tokyo's approach to cross-Strait crises. With a reinforced parliamentary base, these positions are likely to translate into concrete policy steps, from accelerated defence-budget increases toward or beyond 2 percent of GDP to expanded joint exercises and basing arrangements with the United States.

Economically, the government's agenda blends elements of fiscal activism with structural reform. Takaichi campaigned on promises to shield households from rising prices, support industrial competitiveness and deepen Japan's role in the global semiconductor and AI ecosystem, including through outbound investments and strategic partnerships. Japanese firms have already been increasing their stakes in leading chipmakers and AI hardware providers abroad, while the state has offered substantial subsidies for domestic fabs and R&D centres (like the Rapidus project). At the same time, there are debates within Japan's policy community about how to reconcile heavy defence spending, demographic pressures and the need for productivity-enhancing reforms without jeopardising fiscal sustainability. The landslide victory may make it easier to push through politically sensitive measures, but it also concentrates responsibility on Takaichi if public perceptions of inequality or regional tension worsen.

Hyundai Motor Group announces massive 87 billion dollars investment for AI and robotics ecosystem

Hyundai Motor Group has committed to investing 125.2 trillion won (\$87 billion) in South Korea through 2030 – its largest-ever domestic spending plan – with 71 percent earmarked for future growth areas including robotics, artificial intelligence, electric vehicles, hydrogen infrastructure and software-defined vehicles, aiming to establish the country as a global hub for physical AI and humanoid robotics.

The strategy leverages operational data from across the chaebol's automotive, steel, logistics and defence affiliates to create a feedback loop refining robot hardware and AI models, while building an end-to-end value chain encompassing subscriptions, contract manufacturing, training facilities and AI data centres powered by renewable energy along the renewable-rich southwestern coast.

A key component includes a Robot Metaplane Application Center (RMAC) near Hyundai's Georgia EV plant and mass production capacity for 30,000 robot units annually by 2028, integrating Boston Dynamics' humanoid Atlas and quadruped Spot with components from Hyundai Mobis and control systems from Hyundai AutoEver.

The announcement follows a preliminary 10 trillion won (\$7 billion) commitment to the Saemangeum coastal region – a political stronghold of President Lee Jae-myung – centring on robotics factories, AI data centres and hydrogen infrastructure, with shares in Hyundai Motor and Kia surging 10.5 percent and 15 percent respectively after media leaks. This builds on October's agreement to procure up to 50,000 Nvidia AI chips for an "AI factory" and comes after Seoul secured a US tariff reduction on Korean autos from 25 percent to 15 percent, providing fiscal space for Executive Chair Euisun Chung's vision of a "hydrogen, AI city."

Analysts view the pivot as one of the most ambitious by any industrial conglomerate to transition from hardware manufacturing toward AI-driven automation at scale, capitalising on Korea's world-leading factory robot density (1,012 per 10,000 manufacturing workers in 2023) and demographic pressures that could leave the country short 1.22 million workers by 2034.

South Korean chipmaker SK Hynix became Nvidia's indispensable AI memory partner

Once a creditor-owned laggard derisively dubbed the “Curse of Hynix” after the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis and early-2000s DRAM glut, SK Hynix has emerged as the undisputed leader in high-bandwidth memory (HBM) chips critical for AI data processing, capturing over half the global market and serving as Nvidia's primary supplier while securing Microsoft's order for proprietary AI accelerators.

The company's fourth-quarter revenues surged 66 percent year-on-year amid acute shortages of HBM, DRAM and NAND, delivering industry-leading operating margins of 58 percent – surpassing even TSMC – and driving its market capitalisation up 340 percent to around Won640 trillion (\$438 billion) over the past 12 months.

This turnaround stems from a decade-long, contrarian R&D push under CEO Park Sung-wook, who prioritised HBM development when few saw viable demand beyond niche graphics cards; the ChatGPT-fuelled AI boom finally validated the bet as HBM market revenues exploded from \$1 billion in 2022 to \$16 billion in 2024, with projections reaching \$87 billion by 2027. SK Hynix's dominance reflects a “multi-decade accumulation of knowhow” that turned memory constraints into a strategic moat, reshaping its status from perennial follower to sector shaper within the SK Group chaebol.

Looking ahead, SK Hynix is positioning beyond pure-play memory manufacturing by committing \$10 billion to an “AI solutions firm” encompassing data centres, power systems and infrastructure, with construction underway on Korea's largest AI data centre in Ulsan as part of a Won7 trillion campus.

While Samsung has accelerated its HBM capabilities and Chinese players like CXMT gain ground in lower-end DRAM, analysts warn that Nvidia's 85 percent GPU market share grants it leverage to demand ever-higher performance standards and customisation from memory suppliers. Geopolitical crosswinds add complexity: the Wuxi plant produces 40 percent of SK Hynix's DRAM despite US–China tensions, while a \$10 billion US investment aims to placate Washington's “build in America” pressure amid Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick's 100 percent tariff threats – a scenario President Lee Jae-myung dismisses as likely to double US chip prices.

For Seoul, SK Hynix's ascent underscores Korea's centrality to the global AI hardware ecosystem, though sustaining the boom requires navigating intensifying supplier competition, customer concentration risks and the ever-present threat of an AI market correction.

South Korea passes corporate governance reform to dismantle “Korea discount”

South Korea’s National Assembly has approved a landmark revision to the Commercial Act mandating that listed companies cancel newly acquired treasury shares within one year, ending a practice that investors have long criticised for enabling chaebol owner families to maintain control at the expense of minority shareholders.

The measure builds on July’s legislation imposing a fiduciary duty on directors to prioritise all shareholders’ interests – rather than just those of controlling families – alongside mandates for cumulative voting to empower minority representation on boards and separate elections for auditors.

These reforms represent the most significant push yet to address entrenched governance weaknesses that have historically suppressed Korean equity valuations relative to global peers, directly supporting President Lee Jae-myung’s campaign pledge to boost shareholder returns for the country’s vast retail investor base, known as “ants.” The Kospi index has responded decisively, surging more than 40 percent year-to-date to a record above 6,300 points and securing its position as the world’s best-performing major stock market for the second consecutive year following a 76 percent rally in 2025.

Major chaebol such as Samsung Electronics, SK Hynix and Hyundai Motor have proactively announced treasury share cancellations ahead of the law, while the ruling Democratic Party – which controls presidency and parliament – prepares further measures, including a strengthened stewardship code to compel institutional investors like the state-run National Pension Service toward more active ownership.

Lawmakers acknowledge that while significant progress has exceeded expectations in lifting the Kospi toward President Lee’s 5,000-point target, the “Korea discount” persists relative to US and Japanese benchmarks, necessitating sustained efforts to align Korean corporate practices with global standards.

For Seoul, these governance upgrades arrive at a critical juncture, enhancing domestic market confidence amid external pressures from US tariff threats and Chinese economic weight, while positioning chaebol heavyweights in semiconductors, automobiles and shipbuilding as more attractive to international capital seeking exposure to Asia’s innovation champions.

North Korea's Ninth Party Congress celebrates "remarkable" policy successes and sets new five-year course

At its Ninth Workers' Party Congress, convened in Pyongyang from 23 to 25 February 2026 – the first since 2021 – North Korea proclaimed "remarkable" achievements across politics, economy, defence, culture and diplomacy over the past half-decade, framing the period as one of "great transformation" and a springboard for accelerated progress under Kim Jong Un's leadership. In his opening address, Kim hailed the country's ability to overcome "worst difficulties" linked to the COVID-19 downturn and Western sanctions, touting an economic recovery estimated at 3.7 percent growth in 2024 by external observers and crediting deepening ties with Russia and China for providing critical trade, aid and military technology support.

Notably absent from public statements were any references to nuclear weapons development – despite the unveiling of new multiple rocket launchers capable of carrying nuclear warheads – or to relations with the United States and South Korea, which Kim has previously characterised as ties between "two hostile states" with no prospect for reconciliation or unification.

The congress doubles as a platform for consolidating elite loyalty and signalling longer-term political continuity, with speculation focusing on the public role of Kim's daughter, Kim Ju Ae – reportedly aged around 13 – whom South Korean intelligence believes has been positioned as a potential heir in the family dynasty. Economic messaging emphasised "boosting construction and people's living standards" through faster transformation of state and social life, buoyed by expanded barter trade and assistance from Moscow, which has reciprocated North Korea's dispatch of thousands of troops and weapons to support Russia's war in Ukraine.

Friendly messages from the ruling parties of China – Pyongyang's largest trading partner – and Russia underscored the regime's multi-vector external alignment amid ongoing sanctions, while the event's tightly scripted pomp reaffirmed Kim's status as the "Greatest Person in the World" in state media narratives. Policymakers in Seoul and Washington are monitoring closely for signals on future diplomacy, though Pyongyang has so far rebuffed overtures from both South Korean President Lee Jae-myung and US President Donald Trump.

CHINA

Xi Jinping's Push for a "Powerful Currency" and Global Reserve Status

President Xi Jinping has explicitly articulated his ambition for the renminbi to attain status as a primary global reserve currency, urging the development of a "powerful currency" utilized widely in international trade and foreign exchange. Published in the CCP's flagship journal *Qiushi*, these remarks underscore the necessity of establishing a "powerful central bank" and competitive financial institutions to exert influence over global pricing. This push for monetary sovereignty is framed as a strategic imperative to create a counterweight to U.S. financial leverage amidst a fracturing global order and recent volatility in the U.S. dollar, which President Trump has notably described as a "great" development. Despite Beijing's push for a "multi-polar international monetary system," significant structural disparities remain. While the renminbi has emerged as the world's second-largest trade finance currency following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, it accounts for only 1.93 percent of global official reserves, compared to the U.S. dollar's 57 percent and the Euro's 20 percent. Analysts emphasize that achieving true reserve status requires full capital account convertibility, a reform complicated by Beijing's management of an unprecedented USD 1.2 trillion trade surplus and growing international pressure for currency appreciation to correct perceived undervaluation.

Chinese Record Trade Surplus Amidst Strategic Diversification

In a demonstration of economic resilience against U.S. pressure, China recorded a historic trade surplus of USD 1.2 trillion in 2025, a 20 percent increase from the previous year. This milestone was achieved despite a 19.5 percent contraction in exports to the United States, as Chinese manufacturers successfully pivoted towards emerging markets; exports to Africa surged by 26.5 percent, to ASEAN nations by 14 percent, and to Latin America by 8 percent. The composition of this trade also reflects a move up the value chain, with exports of electric vehicles, lithium batteries, and photovoltaic products rising by 27 percent, while high-tech goods such as industrial robots increased by 13 percent. While Beijing views this export performance as a victory, it has exacerbated global trade frictions. Major partners, including the European Union, have flagged the influx of lower-cost Chinese goods as a threat to their domestic industries and economic security; French President Emmanuel Macron recently termed the mounting imbalance "unsustainable." Furthermore, analysts warn that sustaining this export-led growth model faces headwinds from potential protectionist measures against "industrial overcapacity" and ongoing U.S. tariff threats, particularly regarding China's dealings with Iran. Domestically, this reliance on external demand highlights persistent struggles to boost local consumption, which remains dampened by the ongoing property sector crisis.

Friedrich Merz visited China

During his inaugural visit to Beijing, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz sought to recalibrate Germany's "comprehensive strategic partnership" with China, navigating a complex geopolitical landscape marked by a widening transatlantic rift with the U.S. Trump administration. Accompanied by a substantial corporate delegation, Merz's outreach reflects a broader European effort to stabilize relations with Beijing. For a weakened German economy emerging from a two-year recession, China remains an indispensable consumer market and industrial partner.

However, Merz emphasized the necessity of balancing this deep economic interdependence with strategic "derisking." Highlighting recent supply chain vulnerabilities caused by Chinese export controls on vital semiconductors and rare earths, he advocated for a pragmatic approach that encourages mutual investment while actively mitigating systemic risks to domestic manufacturing.

A central focal point of the bilateral dialogues was the unsustainable trajectory of the Sino-German economic relationship, highlighted by a €90 billion trade deficit that has quadrupled since 2020. Merz directly attributed this imbalance to Chinese manufacturing overcapacity, market-distorting subsidies, and an undervalued yuan, all of which severely strained German industrial pillars like the automotive sector. While President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang signaled a willingness to address these grievances, increase high-quality imports, and finalize a substantial order for 120 Airbus aircraft, the formal diplomatic outcomes of the summit were decidedly marginal. The execution of only five peripheral agreements – focusing on localized issues such as climate transition, poultry protocols, and sports collaboration – stood in stark contrast to the more comprehensive bilateral pacts recently secured by Canada and the UK, underscoring the persistent complexities of normalizing Sino-German trade.



Trump to visit Beijing next month for the first time since 2017 amid tariff uncertainty

US President Donald Trump will travel to China from March 31 to April 2 at the invitation of President Xi Jinping – his first official visit since 2017 – coming days after the US Supreme Court struck down the administration’s “Liberation Day” tariffs and hours before Beijing’s annual parliamentary session where Premier Li Qiang will unveil growth targets and stimulus measures against a backdrop of renewed trade friction.

The White House confirmed the dates as both leaders have recently described bilateral communication as “excellent” and “good,” with Trump calling the trip “wild” and urging China to stage its grandest welcome ever; tariffs will loom large on the agenda alongside China’s potential retaliation such as halting US soybean purchases – once its top export to Beijing – while Washington weighs responses to Beijing’s surging electric vehicle exports and continued arms sales to Taiwan, which Xi has vowed to unify by force if necessary.

The timing underscores tightly intertwined US–China economic dynamics: America’s share of China’s exports has halved to 9.6 percent since 2017, yet remains critical as Washington’s AI investment boom sustains demand for Chinese chips and power equipment, while Beijing eyes “whitelists” for cross-border investment and stable tariff guidelines to shield its surplus-driven recovery.

Chinese analysts anticipate Trump may seek commitments on trade imbalances and technology flows during the visit, which precedes a China Development Forum drawing US executives, though Commerce Ministry statements already demand full US tariff cancellation amid warnings that policy “stop-and-go” complicates global inventory management.

For Beijing, managing parliamentary expectations around tech self-reliance – including updates to its five-year AI plan featuring players like DeepSeek – while calibrating stimulus for property and consumption will test policymakers’ confidence in a fragile trade truce, as any AI spending bust in the US could force accelerated domestic rebalancing and underscore the enduring mutual vulnerabilities despite rhetorical de-escalation.

China escalates economic and cultural pressure on Japan

Since Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's November comments suggesting Japanese Self-Defense Forces intervention in a potential Chinese attack on Taiwan – remarks aligning with Tokyo's longstanding position but unprecedented from a sitting premier – Beijing has unleashed multifaceted “grey zone” pressure across diplomatic, military, economic and cultural domains, analysts describe as broader and more diffuse than past spats rooted in historical tensions.

China reclaimed its giant pandas from Ueno Zoo to public dismay, slashed tourism via travel warnings and 49 cancelled flight routes (Chinese visitors comprise a quarter of Japan's foreign arrivals), restricted rare earth and critical mineral exports alongside dual-use technologies to 20 Japanese firms including Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki subsidiaries, postponed trilateral summits, lodged UN complaints and invoked Japan's World War II aggression at the Munich Security Conference.

Military signalling includes warship passages, drone incursions, radar locks on Japanese aircraft and coast guard standoffs near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, while cultural retaliation cancelled Japanese concerts, film releases and a Pokémon event at Yasukuni Shrine, with online nationalists deploying AI videos pitting Ultraman against Takaichi.

Takaichi's landslide snap election victory granting her Liberal Democratic Party a two-thirds majority has fortified her refusal to retract the Taiwan remarks despite dispatching senior diplomats, leaving analysts sceptical of near-term de-escalation as China seeks to “normalise” assertive behaviours through sustained low-level coercion akin to its Taiwan playbook.

Beijing frames export controls curbing Japan's “remilitarisation and nuclear ambitions” as “legitimate and reasonable,” insisting they spare “honest” entities while adding 20 more firms like Subaru to a licensing watchlist; Tokyo reports economic pain from tourism and mineral disruptions but leverages its strengthened parliamentary position to pursue conservative security shifts without apology. The standoff tests Japan's resilience against China's weaponised interdependence – from rare earths vital for defence industries to Chinese consumer demand fuelling service sectors – while highlighting Beijing's sensitivity to overt alliance signalling amid US extended deterrence commitments, with no immediate off-ramp as both capitals prioritise domestic political imperatives over bilateral reconciliation

AUSTRALIA AND OCEANIA

Australia commits AU\$3.9 billion to AUKUS submarine yard in Osborne

In mid-February 2026, the Australian government announced an initial allocation of roughly 3.9 billion Australian dollars – about 2.7 to 2.8 billion US dollars – to accelerate construction of a new nuclear-powered submarine shipyard at Osborne in South Australia, a core industrial pillar of the AUKUS security partnership with the United States and the United Kingdom. The facility is expected to support the building of a new class of SSN-AUKUS submarines incorporating US, UK and Australian technology, with long-term projections suggesting total investment could reach around AU\$30 billion over the next decade. This marks one of the largest single defence-industrial commitments in Australian history and signals Canberra's determination to develop a sovereign nuclear-submarine construction and sustainment capability, even as it relies heavily on US and UK expertise in the early phases.

Strategically, the Osborne investment is intended to anchor Australia more deeply within an Indo-Pacific deterrence architecture aimed at dissuading China from coercive actions in maritime domains stretching from the South China Sea to the Southern Ocean. Under the AUKUS roadmap, US-operated Virginia-class submarines are expected to begin rotational deployments to Australia from 2027, with eventual sales of several Virginias to Canberra in the early 2030s, followed by the introduction of domestically built SSN-AUKUS boats. The February announcement emphasised not only the military dimension but also the industrial and employment benefits, highlighting thousands of anticipated high-skilled jobs in shipbuilding, nuclear engineering and advanced manufacturing, and positioning the project as a driver of regional development in South Australia.

However, the scale and time horizon of the programme also raise questions about fiscal sustainability, opportunity costs and political durability. Critics in Australia argue that committing hundreds of billions of dollars over several decades to nuclear submarines may crowd out investments in other defence capabilities, climate adaptation or social services, especially in a volatile strategic environment where technological breakthroughs – for instance in uncrewed systems – could alter the cost-effectiveness of traditional platforms. Moreover, AUKUS remains controversial among some regional neighbours and domestic constituencies, who worry about nuclear proliferation risks, strategic entrapment or the perception of an exclusively Anglophone security axis. Managing these concerns while maintaining bipartisan support over successive electoral cycles will be critical to the programme's success.

Royal Australian Navy steps up presence in the South China Sea

In February 2026, the Royal Australian Navy's Anzac-class frigate HMAS Toowoomba conducted a "routine transit" through the South China Sea as part of a broader Regional Presence Deployment, underscoring Canberra's commitment to upholding freedom of navigation and the international rules-based order in contested waters.

Australian defence authorities framed the operation as consistent with long-standing practice under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, highlighting the South China Sea's status as a vital artery for global trade and the importance of resisting attempts to unilaterally alter maritime entitlements. The deployment followed a pattern of regular Australian naval and air operations in the region, often conducted in coordination with partners, which Beijing has criticised as provocative.

These activities should be viewed in the context of intensifying Chinese military and paramilitary presence in the South China Sea, including coast guard patrols, maritime militia operations and the militarisation of artificial features. By maintaining a visible presence, Australia seeks to signal that it will not acquiesce to expansive maritime claims or coercive behaviour, while also reassuring Southeast Asian partners that extra-regional democracies remain engaged in the region's security.

The operations also provide opportunities to hone interoperability with US and other allied forces, as Australian platforms increasingly train and exercise alongside a network of partners executing similar freedom-of-navigation and overflight operations.

For Australia, however, a more active posture in the South China Sea also entails higher operational tempo, greater exposure to potential incidents at sea and the need to invest in resilient communications and crisis-management channels to prevent miscalculation.

It reinforces the argument in Canberra that investments in advanced capabilities – such as those envisaged under AUKUS – are necessary to credibly sustain a forward presence, deter coercion and contribute to regional stability. Yet it also increases the risk that Australia will find itself on the front line of any major US–China confrontation in maritime East Asia, with significant implications for its own security and economic resilience.

Australian and New Zealand currencies lead in global monetary cycle

The Australian and New Zealand dollars have emerged as the strongest performers in the G10 FX space this year, acting as “canaries in the coal mine” for a broader shift from rate cuts toward renewed monetary tightening.

The Australian dollar has appreciated by more than 6 percent against the US dollar to a three-year high as the Reserve Bank of Australia initiated what markets expect to be a new hiking cycle in response to stickier-than-expected inflation, with the “trimmed mean” measure rising to 3.4 percent year-on-year in January.

The New Zealand dollar has gained around 4 percent on expectations that the Reserve Bank of New Zealand will deliver its first rate increase in the coming months. Higher relative policy rates and the prospect of additional hikes reward investors who hold these currencies and signal that the era of broad-based post-pandemic rate cuts is giving way to a new phase of targeted, inflation-focused tightening in select advanced economies.

At the same time, these “commodity currencies” are benefiting from firmer prices for energy, metals and agricultural exports, as well as from investor efforts to diversify away from the US dollar amid concerns over volatile US policymaking and rising sovereign debt burdens.

With Australian interest rates now above US levels for the first time since 2017, strategists see scope for further support from both gradual commodity price gains and a softer dollar, particularly if the Federal Reserve ultimately leaves rates on hold rather than delivering the two or three cuts still priced by parts of the market.

Investors increasingly frame Australia and New Zealand as fiscally sound, resource-rich jurisdictions offering a combination of higher yields and institutional stability, making their currencies attractive destinations for capital seeking both carry and perceived macroeconomic resilience as the global monetary cycle pivots back toward a more hawkish stance.

EU–Australia trade and security pact inches toward conclusion amid unresolved sensitivities

After talks collapsed in late 2023 over agricultural market access, Brussels and Canberra are again moving rapidly toward a comprehensive trade and security agreement, with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen preparing to travel to Australia following a new round of negotiations between EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič and Australian Trade Minister Don Farrell in Brussels.

The package is intended to pair a free-trade deal with a formal security and defence partnership, reflecting converging concerns over China and the impact of Donald Trump’s tariff agenda, as well as a shared interest in cooperation on research, critical minerals and defence industrial projects.

For Australia, which faces pressure from both Chinese economic coercion and volatile US trade policy, securing a high-quality agreement with a like-minded partner is seen as both a strategic hedge and a political win; for the EU, it fits into a broader effort to diversify supply chains and deepen ties with Indo-Pacific democracies through a sequence of new agreements.

The most contentious issues remain agricultural quotas, geographical indications and resource pricing. Australian farmers are pushing for “significantly increased access” for beef, lamb, sugar, rice and dairy, arguing that largely unsubsidised exports need more room in the protected European market, while EU negotiators must balance any concessions against the risk of a domestic backlash from farmers already mobilised over the Mercosur deal.

At the same time, Brussels insists on strict protection of geographical indications for products such as prosecco, feta and parmesan, directly affecting long-established Australian wine and dairy producers, and is pressing Canberra to address dual-pricing of critical raw materials and legacy distortions such as the 33 percent luxury vehicle tax that hits high-end European cars.

The likely landing zone involves carefully calibrated quotas, grace periods for existing brands and a structured framework for critical minerals, but the negotiation has entered a compressed endgame in which both sides must assemble a package that can be defended to farmers, industry and parliaments while symbolically anchoring a deeper strategic alignment.

Nauru launches discounted citizenship-by-investment programme linked to climate resilience

Nauru, the world’s smallest republic with just 12,000 inhabitants, has introduced a limited-time Economic and Climate Resilience Citizenship Programme (ECRCP) offering passports from as low as US\$95,000 for the main applicant until June 2026 – a discount from the standard US\$115,000 contribution to the Nauru Treasury Fund, with additional fees for family members bringing total costs for a household under comparable Caribbean or European schemes.

Funds are explicitly directed toward the Higher Ground Initiative, a 50-year plan to relocate population and infrastructure inland amid rising sea levels, blending citizenship-by-investment with climate adaptation in a phosphate-depleted economy pivoting toward services and aid. The passport grants visa-free or visa-on-arrival access to around 85–90 destinations, including Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and the UAE, appealing primarily to high-net-worth individuals seeking a low-cost, fast-track (three-to-four months) “Plan B” without residency requirements, subject to stringent due diligence excluding criminals, sanctioned entities or high-risk jurisdictions.



ASIA IN CZECHIA

India to Cut EU Car Tariffs, Competition in Local Market Will Rise

India and the European Union are close to finalizing a long-sought trade agreement that would significantly reduce India's high import duties on European automobiles, opening up the world's third-largest car market to foreign brands after decades of protectionist policies dominated by tariffs as high as 110% on imported vehicles.

Under the proposed plan, a gradually lowered tariff regime could eventually see a 10 % duty on a limited quota of up to 250,000 European cars annually, though this preferential treatment would apply mainly to internal combustion engine models and not electric vehicles, where India intends to favour domestic producers.

For Škoda Auto Volkswagen India, which manufactures cars locally and thus avoids import classification, the deal is seen as an opportunity to expand operations. Despite increased access, Indian policymakers still aim to protect domestic manufacturing and prioritise local suppliers as the automotive landscape evolves.

Czech Firms Turn to Filipino Workers as Local Labour Shortage Grows

Czech companies struggling with a persistent labour shortage are increasingly recruiting workers from the Philippines, a trend driven by tight domestic labour markets where businesses would readily hire 250,000 additional workers if available.

A typical Filipino hire costs about CZK 85,000 per employee in relocation and administrative expenses, and the practice is now expanding beyond the Czech Republic to employers in Slovakia and Italy.

Employers find Filipino candidates appealing not only because of cultural adaptability and the prevalence of English as an official language, but also due to strong global mobility in the Filipino workforce, where expatriate work is common in many families.

Czechia removes work permit requirements for Taiwanese nationals

Effective early March 2026, Czechia will exempt Taiwanese citizens from work permit and employee card requirements, allowing direct labour market access, building on last year's employment law amendment that already waived authorisation for nationals from Australia, Japan, Canada, South Korea, New Zealand, the UK and the US. The measure targets high-skilled workers to alleviate administrative burdens on employers frustrated by lengthy procedures for third-country recruitment, where only 185 Taiwanese were employed as of June 2024; it overcomes prior legal hurdles by recognising Taiwan's separate jurisdiction despite the One-China policy, facilitating talent inflows critical for technology and manufacturing sectors.

The policy shift follows strengthened Czech-Taiwan ties since President Petr Pavel's 2023 call with President Tsai Ing-wen – condemned by Beijing as interference in internal affairs – and Foreign Minister Jan Lipavský's emphasis on partnerships with democracies like Taiwan despite official adherence to One-China. As part of broader reforms attracting global expertise amid labour shortages, the exemption positions Czechia competitively for semiconductor-adjacent investment from the world's chipmaking leader, reinforcing its role as a European hub for Indo-Pacific technology collaboration while navigating geopolitical sensitivities around cross-Strait dynamics.



CAPS INTERVIEW



Marina Sheikh is not only a new member of our CAPS Advisory Board, but also an Indian philanthropist and founder of the Rising World Foundation.

In January, she delivered a lecture at the premises of CEVRO University on women empowerment and charity in India. As part of her stay in Prague, she gave us an interview, where she discussed issues related to development in India and Asia in general. The talk was conducted by Daniela Finkousová.

Your professional life began in European politics. Leaving a stable position within European institutions and moving into the non-profit sector in India was a major step. How was the change from the European Parliament to nonprofit the environment in India?

It was a huge transition for me to move from the European Parliament back to India. It has been quite an enriching journey both with the parliament and the foundation. However, it was a very, very difficult step to move back to India. Things are very different back home and also very different in Europe. Overall, it's been quite an enriching experience.

Did you ever have a moment when you questioned that decision and wondered whether leaving politics had been a mistake?

I did, and I sometimes still miss my life in Europe very, very much. But at the same time seeing the people I'm serving it gives me the reason to stay and motivates me to do much more for my country and my people.

Rising World Foundation was established during the COVID-19 pandemic. Was it an improvised response to a crisis, or did you already have a longer-term vision in mind at the time?

I always had the vision to go back home and serve the people of my country. I had already registered the Rising World Foundation while I was working in the European Parliament. That was back in 2017 that I had registered the foundation, but I only started the operations during the COVID-19 pandemic. Seeing the struggles of my fellow citizens made me realize I must really do something for the people.

And honestly at that point I did not even remember that I had my own charity or non-profit where I could work and serve the people. However my family was distributing ration kits, food and supply at the time to people in need. During this time I suggested to my family that we do these activities under the foundation's name. And that's how we began the operations and started working full-time as the Rising World Foundation.

When we talk about helping the poor, it often sounds abstract. Is there a specific story from the field that has stayed with you and shaped how you see your work today?

You know, actually there are so many stories because every day I meet so many people and every day there is a new story. But there are quite a few that have touched my heart and have remained very close to me. There was this one old lady who was a widow, who had no children, no family at all and no food to eat too.

And despite her circumstances, she was still so courageous and willing to work. Which is pretty rare in the country. People usually want to beg and find a way to easy money, but she at the age of around 80, she was willing to work. And that's what inspired me, that at that age she was still ready to make a change.

From your perspective, what is the most fundamental structural cause of poverty in India?

Illiteracy is, I would say, one of the biggest causes of poverty back home. Illiteracy and unemployment are the primary drivers. And we're all trying to bridge the gap. All foundations and even the government, but there's a long way to go, you know. I mean, with a country like that of ours with a population of 1.4 billion people it is very difficult to for everyone to survive and thrive equally. But we are trying.

When it comes to women empowerment in impoverished communities, is the struggle more economic or cultural?

In India's underserved communities, the struggle for women's empowerment is both economic and cultural. Access to education and income opportunities is crucial, but so is fostering awareness around traditional norms, because real change happens when economic progress and social attitudes move together.

Many young people in Europe feel a strong desire to "change the world," but don't know where to start. What would you tell them?

Chase your dreams because they do come true. I believed this myself and I still do believe that I should chase my dreams. Only then will they come true. So it's a constant journey. You have to constantly chase and then you'll get somewhere for sure.

Finally, on a personal level: what does success mean to you today?

Success is something very personal. For me it's being able to serve to the people in every possible way that I can. Serving my people and to be able to give them what they deserve is success for me. But I'm sure the definition is different for everyone.



UPCOMING EVENTS

Problems of Japanese Geopolitics in Historical Context – A Lecture by Dr. Roman Kodet

11th March, 5:00 pm, Venue: Room D223, Drtinova 467, Praha 5

The lecture will provide an overview of the key factors that have long shaped Japanese geopolitical thinking and Japan's contemporary foreign policy. It will focus in particular on the development and transformation of the security partnership with the United States. It will also address Japan's complex relations with China, the Korean Peninsula, and Russia.

An important theme will be Japan's existing territorial disputes, which carry the potential for escalation into conflict. The lecture will link major historical milestones with current security challenges, such as China's growing military activity, North Korea's missile program, and tensions surrounding Taiwan.

Participants will gain an understanding of how the Japanese government responds to a changing security environment, which strategies it adopts, and what constraints arise from historical experience as well as institutional and constitutional frameworks. The lecture will thus offer a comprehensive overview of Japan's geopolitical position situated within a deeper historical context.



NEW CAPS POLICY OVERVIEW ON VIETNAM PUBLISHED

We are pleased to share with you our February 2026 Policy Overview, Vietnam's 14th National Party Congress: The "Streamlining Revolution" & Business Outlook - Implications and Opportunities for Czech and European Businesses, published by our Center for Asia-Pacific Studies (CAPS) at CEVRO Univerzita.

At its 14th National Party Congress, Vietnam's leadership introduced an ambitious reform agenda centered on institutional streamlining, administrative efficiency, economic restructuring, and strengthening the country's global competitiveness. The so-called "Streamlining Revolution" aims to modernize governance, improve the business environment, accelerate digital transformation, and sustain Vietnam's dynamic growth trajectory.

For Czech and European companies, these developments create new opportunities in trade, investment, high-value manufacturing, green energy, innovation, and services. As Vietnam consolidates its role as a key economic player in Southeast Asia and an important EU partner, understanding these reforms is essential for strategic positioning in the region.

This overview offers a concise analysis of the new political direction and economic priorities, outlining practical implications for businesses seeking to expand in Vietnam and the broader Asian market.

Read it here: <https://www.cevro.cz/file/2262>



PREVIOUS EVENTS

Dr. Elzbieta Pron delivered a lecture on the future of the EU's Global Gateway in Central Asia at CEVRO University

On Monday, 23rd February, a lecture entitled Central Asia as a Partner: Reality and the Future of the EU Global Gateway Initiative in the Region took place at CEVRO University in Prague. The main guest of the event was Dr. Elzbieta Pron from the University of Silesia in Katowice, an expert on China's foreign policy and Central Asian politics, who visited Prague at the invitation of the Center for Asia-Pacific Studies (CAPS).

In her lecture, Dr. Pron analysed the evolving geopolitical context of the European Union's Global Gateway strategy since its launch in 2021, placing it within the broader framework of great power competition and regional connectivity. Particular attention was devoted to the comparison between the EU's Global Gateway and China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as well as to the changing dynamics of EU-Central Asia relations.

„Global Gateway is clearly a response to China's Belt and Road Initiative. The main challenge in Central Asia is not the region itself, but the geopolitical consequences of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which disrupted infrastructure and limited connectivity options for both China and the EU.

Interestingly, both initiatives now follow very similar paths, particularly through the Caspian corridor, and both emphasise digital and modern infrastructure development. The key difference lies in implementation: China operates quickly and pragmatically, while the European Union must follow stricter transparency and regulatory standards. This makes the EU approach more complex – and often less flexible – than China's model,” Dr. Pron emphasised.



„The differences between the European and Chinese approaches are not as fundamental as often assumed. Both focus on infrastructure and green energy development. China’s main advantage is geographic proximity, which allows for easier integration of transport and energy networks. For the EU, connectivity is more complex due to logistical constraints and the lack of direct borders.

The key distinction lies in implementation: China tends to act more swiftly and pragmatically, while the EU operates within stricter regulatory and transparency frameworks. Central Asian states generally respond positively to both, though cooperation with the EU can be more procedurally demanding,” she added.

The lecture was followed by an expert discussion with students and faculty members, focusing on the future trajectory of EU–Central Asia relations and the measurable indicators of Global Gateway’s effectiveness in the coming years.

The event, organised by CAPS, once again highlighted the growing strategic importance of Central Asia in contemporary international relations and underscored CEVRO University’s commitment to fostering informed debate on global geopolitical developments.





Czech Sinologist Vít Vojta Talked about The Lunar New Year Tradition and Its Impact on Business and Life in Asia

On 17th February, the Center for Asia-Pacific Studies (CAPS) at CEVRO University recently held a public lecture titled “The Lunar New Year of the Horse in Tradition, Economy, Politics, and Communication Strategy.” The event focused on the broader importance of the lunar calendar in East Asia and showed that it plays a much bigger role than many people in Europe might expect.

The lecture explained how the lunar calendar influences not only cultural traditions and celebrations, but also political decisions, economic activity, business strategies, and even market behavior. Through practical examples, participants learned how the symbolism of the Year of the Horse can shape public communication, branding, diplomatic gestures, and strategic planning.

The guest speaker, Vít Vojta, a sinologist, ethnologist, and lawyer with long-standing experience from official visits, business cooperation, and community events in Asia, offered both historical background and real-world insight.

His presentation connected cultural traditions with contemporary political and economic practice. The event provided students and members of the public with a clearer understanding of why cultural context matters when engaging with Asia today. It also reflected CAPS’ mission to connect academic expertise with practical knowledge about the Asia-Pacific region.





CAPS IN THE MEDIA

Dr. Jan Železný for Info.cz: Šoková terapie ve Vietnamu: Propouští se 15 % úředníků, aby země rostla o 10 % ročně.

<https://www.info.cz/podcasty/infotalks/jan-zelezny-rozhovor-vietnam-ekonomika-bambusova-diplomacie>

Dr. Jan Železný for Info.cz: Pokerový all-in se vyplatil. „Železná lady“ Takaiči získala absolutní moc k přebudování Japonska.

<https://www.info.cz/zpravodajstvi-a-komentare/sanae-takaici-vitezstvi-volby-japonsko-transformace>

Dr. Jan Železný for TV Joj24: Štúdio 24: Japonská železná lady posilnila:

<https://joj24.noviny.sk/studio-joj-24/1169832-studio-24-japonska-zelezna-lady-posilnila?>

Dr. Jan Železný for Info.cz: Kovy vzácnější než ropa: Trumpův Project Vault má ukončit surovinové vydírání USA Čínou.

<https://www.info.cz/zpravodajstvi-a-komentare/cina-strategicke-suroviny-konec-vydirani-vault>

Dr. Jan Železný's comment for CNN Prima News: Stín draka nad Kremlem: Čína posiluje dominanci nad Ruskem a expanduje na jeho Dálný východ:

<https://cnn.iprima.cz/hegemon-asie-posiluje-vliv-nad-slabsim-partnerem-cina-expanduje-na-vytouzeny-vychod-ruska-502694>

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